Air Power As A Coercive Instrument - Softcover

Coercionthe use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavioris a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify thirdparty threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic

Daniel L. Byman (Ph.D., political science, M.I.T.) is a policy analyst at Rand whose research interests include modeling ethnic conflict, assessing Middle East politics and security issues, developing countermeasures against terrorism, reevaluating air power theory, and other general issues related to U.S. foreign policy. Eric Larson (Ph.D., Policy Analysis, Rand Graduate School) is a policy analyst at Rand with nearly two decades of experience, primarily in national security and foreign affairs.